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 Growing Pains 
 Marijuana Legalization in Maine 
 Wendy  Chapkis 
 Introduction 
 In 2015 at a Maine Marijuana Summit, just months before this U.S. state would vote on legaliza-
tion, a progressive state representative, Diane Russell (D-Portland) urged activists not to become 
distracted or divided over the question of who would make money after prohibition ended. In the 
face of the need to end the War on Drugs, she said, “conversation about who makes profi ts o  this 
industry is irrelevant” (Russell 2015b). 
 I have come to disagree. I entered the conversation about marijuana legalization in the 1990s, 
writing an ethnography of one of the very earliest medical marijuana patient collectives in the US, 
the  Wo/men’s Alliance for Medical Marijuana ( WAMM ) in Santa Cruz, California. 1 For the members 
of  WAMM , cannabis was a medicine, not a money tree. In fact, the co-founder of the organization, 
Valerie Leveroni Corral, was a ectionately known to the membership as the “anti-profi t.” Valerie, 
Michael Corral, and a group of seriously ill and terminally ill patients, collectively cultivated, har-
vested, and processed a small crop of cannabis and redistributed it  without charge to the 200 or so 
patient members. 
 This glorious, and fraught, experiment in the provision of medicine outside a cash economy sur-
vived for more than 25 years 2 despite the challenges of relying largely on volunteer labor and in the 
face of the very signifi cant threats from the federal government. In 2002, in an early morning raid by 
the federal Drug Enforcement Administration, the collective’s garden was destroyed, the co-founders 
were taken into custody by armed agents, and the seriously ill membership was traumatized. Valerie 
and Michael engaged in years of legal battles in the federal courts before winning important con-
cessions. Early medical marijuana activists, then, were not only doing the work of patient care and 
cannabis provision but were also on the front lines doing battle against prohibition. 
 Writing about  WAMM made clear to me that, while their marijuana was free, it certainly was 
not without cost to the people who cultivated and distributed it. Now, in the early decades of 
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cannabis legalization, the debt owed to those early activists is being repaid instead to venture capital-
ists who are cashing in on a safer investment climate. And, as prominent drug policy reform advo-
cates observe, it is reshaping the movement. Just months before the 2016 election (in which medical 
marijuana would extend its reach by becoming legal in over half of all states in the US, and in which 
voters would legalize adult recreational use in four more states—California, Nevada, Massachusetts 
and Maine) the founder of the national  Drug Policy Alliance , Ethan Nadelmann, warned that it might 
be the “last year in which drug policy reform organizations, driven primarily by concerns of civil 
liberties and civil rights and other good public policy motivations, will be able to signifi cantly shape 
the legislation. [. . .] as the years progress, various industry forces will loom larger” (Lopez 2015). 
The same year, the national policy director for the Marijuana Policy Project Dan Ri  e resigned 
because, he said, “the industry is taking over the legalization movement” (Warner 2015). 
 How Did We Get There From Here? Marijuana Legalization in Maine 
 For more than 40 years, Maine has been at the forefront of e orts in the US to end the war on can-
nabis. In 1976, it was the third state to decriminalize marijuana. In 1999, Maine became the fi rst 
state east of the Mississippi to legalize the medical use of marijuana. And, a decade later, in 2009, the 
state created a loosely regulated system for licensing small grower/caregivers. 
 The 2009 law also created a very limited dispensary system, authorizing only eight for the entire 
state of Maine—half of which were awarded to one company,  Wellness Connection —creating vari-
ous interconnected dissatisfactions. The dispensaries were subject to much more stringent regula-
tion than small growers, including inspections, product testing, and security requirements, a fact 
that dispensary lawyers and lobbyists frequently complained about. Caregivers, on the other hand, 
who were allowed to cultivate no more than 30 plants (fi ve each for up to six patients), sco ed at 
the notion that they were unfairly advantaged by the rules, pointing to the monopoly dispensaries 
enjoyed on large-scale cultivation and distribution. 
 The law that limited the number of plants, and patients, for each caregiver, also prohibited 
small growers from selling any portion of their crop to the licensed dispensaries. Dispensaries were 
required to be vertically integrated, growing and processing everything they distributed. State Rep-
resentative Diane Russell acknowledged that “the state artifi cially created a system that created fric-
tion [between dispensaries and small growers] when they could have actually created a system that 
was synergistic or symbiotic” (Russell 2015a). 
 Despite the bother and expense of producing a more regulated crop, the dispensaries did well. 
Their sales showed impressive growth year after year. In 2014, dispensary sales rose by 40% and, in 
2015, by another 46% (Miller 2017). 
 Meanwhile, caregivers, attempting to operate within the legal constraints of 30 plants and 6 
patients, struggled. As Russell noted, “It’s hard to be a caregiver and follow the rules because you 
don’t make any money. I mean, if you’re a good farmer you can develop a huge crop o  of one plant. 
What do you do when you can only sell so much to your 6 patients?” (Russell 2015a). 
 Things changed for caregiver cultivators in 2016, when they agreed to increased regulation in 
exchange for the right to legally sell their harvest to any number of authorized patients. In addition, 
they were allowed (with municipal approval) to open small retail shops (in e ect, small dispensaries). 
The e ect was dramatic: the number of licensed caregivers increased by almost 43% in 2017 to more 
than 3,000; about half of Maine’s estimated 51,000 patients began securing their cannabis through 
small caregiver cultivators (Overton 2017). 
 The eight larger dispensaries still saw growth in their sales, but at a much slower rate of increase. 
The president of the Maine Dispensary Operators Association, Timothy Smale, complained “They 
[patients] get all this information. They get all these products. They buy from us for a while, and 
we never see them again after a few more months because they fi nd a better price” (Overton 2017). 
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 Tensions between the large- and small-scale cultivator/distributors were reproduced in e orts to 
legalize recreational adult-use of marijuana. At least two legislative proposals failed in the legisla-
ture in part because the sponsors of the measures (Diane Russell and Mark Dion, both Democratic 
Representatives from Portland) were unable to secure the support of both the caregivers and the 
dispensaries. “Both sides,” Russell argued, “want exclusivity in the new market. But the real crux 
is that I’m trying to bring accountability and oversight to the industry. That’s what the caregivers 
hate about my bill” (Russell 2015a). Paul McCarrier, the lobbyist for the caregiver community, on 
the other hand, argued that the proposals, especially Rep. Dion’s, were “a dispensary monopoly 
model bill. It’s not like you’re trying to say ‘look, let’s put some fair regulations on this [small grower 
caregiver] sector of the industry to make sure it’s abiding by the laws and the rules’ ” (McCarrier 
2015a). 
 In an e ort to take control of the conversation over what would constitute “fair regulations,” 
and specifi cally to protect the interests of small growers, Paul McCarrier, working with a group 
of caregivers, drafted a citizen’s initiative to legalize marijuana.  Legalize Maine ’s tagline was “save 
small farmers, keep profi ts local.” The national  Marijuana Policy Proj ect had already spearheaded 
two successful local legalization initiatives (in the cities of Portland and South Portland) and was 
eager to add Maine to the list of states that had legalized adult-use. But because of concerns that 
the local group,  Legalize Maine , was too intransigent and too unprofessional to win a campaign, 
the  MPP began collecting signatures for their own competing initiative to “ Regulate Marijuana 
Like Alcohol .” 
 In many ways, the  Legalize and the  Regulate initiatives were more di erent in tone than in sub-
stance. Both initiatives, for example, provided for home cultivation and on-site consumption in 
licensed retail settings.  Legalize Maine ’s proposal, however, included a total cultivation cap of 800,000 
square feet, setting aside 40% of those licenses for small growers. The  Regulate campaign believed 
that a cultivation cap would be too limiting and instead attempted, in their initiative, to protect locals 
from out-of-state investment through a temporary residency requirement. 3
 As the deadline to submit signatures approached, it appeared both initiatives might qualify for 
the ballot, likely dooming both to defeat by splitting the vote. At the last moment, the national 
Marijuana Policy Project agreed to drop their initiative and throw their weight and resources behind 
the local campaign. MPP’s decision may have been infl uenced by the fact that national momentum 
seemed threatened after Ohioans rejected a corporate-cannabis funded initiative. As the Interna-
tional Business Times reported, “the specter of the failed initiative will likely haunt the cannabis 
scene for a long time. Looking back, people may see what happened in Ohio as a turning point in 
the cannabis crusade, the moment when the national dialogue around legalization shifted in ways 
that might not bode well for marijuana advocacy” (Warner 2015). In short, national marijuana 
legalization organizations could ill a ord another loss in Maine. 
 While the merger of the two campaigns increased the likelihood of the measure passing, it set o  
alarms among members of the caregiver community who were suspicious of the intentions of the 
national organization. Paul McCarrier of the  Legalize campaign admitted: 
 “We did too good of a job demonizing them [the  Regulate campaign]. And people don’t really 
understand the initiative process so they’re under the impression that, because  MPP will be 
running the campaign, that they can just arbitrarily change the language after it’s passed. But it 
doesn’t work like that. The legislature does not change the wording of citizen’s initiatives if the 
language is cut and dry” 
 (McCarrier 2015b) 
 But, in fact, the legislature did exactly that. After the initiative passed (by a less than one percent 
margin) 4 , the Maine legislature signifi cantly rewrote the law before allowing it to be implemented. 
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In fact, the 2016 legislature, changed—or outright repealed—every one of the citizen’s initiatives 
that had passed that year. 5 The changes to marijuana legalization included removing some of the 
more innovative elements of the law including on-site consumption at “social clubs.” In addition, the 
legislature changed the provisions in the law specifi cally intended to protect small growers from out-
of-state corporate competition. The cultivation cap was eliminated, making unlimited cultivation 
licenses available, thus removing the requirement that 40% would be set aside for small growers. The 
legislature instead turned to language in the abandoned  Regulate initiative, adding a temporary state 
residency requirement for owners and investors with controlling interest in Maine marijuana busi-
nesses. The state O  ce of Marijuana Policy explained that the residency rule would “help prevent 
large, out-of-state companies” from “controlling the Maine recreational market” and “help Maine 
residents” keep the industry “rooted in Maine” (Overton 2019b). 
 Then, just days before the legislature was set for a fi nal vote on the new rules, the largest dis-
pensary group in the state,  Wellness Connection threatened to sue over the residency requirement for 
controlling investment in a marijuana business (Valigra 2019). Of particular concern to them were 
provisions making it di  cult for out-of-state companies to hide behind the “corporate veil” of com-
plex ownership structures to disguise out-of-state control (Mistler 2019). The threatened lawsuit 
would indefi nitely delay implementation of the already 3 year old law. 6
 The stakes were clear to small growers who urged the Maine legislature to stand fi rm and “keep 
out-of-state interests from gobbling up the state’s marijuana market, and keep whatever profi ts are 
to be made from it in the hands of Mainers” (Overton 2019a). The owner of one small dispensary, 
Glenn Peterson, supported the residency requirement because, he said, “We want to give Maine 
residents a chance before the big boys come in” (Overton 2019a). 
 Nonetheless, within days of the threatened suit, the legislature agreed to revise the residency 
rules.  Wellness Connection ’s attorney Dan Walker, told the press, “We can work with the changes 
that were made. We do not feel we need to bring a lawsuit” (Mistler 2019). The legislature passed 
the regulations and implementation commenced. The state began to approve licenses and cities and 
towns began the process of opting and granting local licenses. 
 But, one year later, just before the fi rst recreational retail sales were set to begin,  Wellness Con-
nection reversed course and sued to remove all remaining residency restrictions. 7 The timing of the 
lawsuit was striking, coming just three days after a state of civil emergency was declared in Maine fol-
lowing the fi rst confi rmed cases of COVID-19. The Governor’s safer-at-home quarantine triggered 
mass unemployment and widespread concern about the long-term consequences on the important 
tourist economy in “Vacationland” (as Maine license plates read). The lawsuit fi led by  Wellness Con-
nection threatened the one bright spot on the economic horizon: projected increases in tax revenues 
from legal marijuana sales. In 2019, retail sales of medical marijuana reached over $111 million dol-
lars making it the third largest industry in the state (Valigra 2020). Based on the experiences of other 
states with legalized medical and recreational adult-use, sales in Maine were projected to increase to 
$180 million dollars in the fi rst year (Overton 2020b). The  Wellness Connection lawsuit which halted 
implementation represented a very real threat to that much needed tax revenue in the state. Within 
six weeks of the suit being fi led, the state Attorney General’s o  ce acceded, refusing to defend the 
residency restrictions in court (Shepherd 2019). 
 The Future of Small Cultivation in the State of Maine 
 Currently, over 75% of medical marijuana sales in Maine are in the hands of small grower caregivers; 
the other 25% is controlled by the large dispensaries, most notably  Wellness Connection with half of 
all those licenses. For now, the medical marijuana sector remains separate from the recreational one, 
regulated under a separate set of rules. This could give small medical marijuana growers and retail-
ers a limited advantage, at least initially. As David Boyer of the  Regulate campaign points out, some 
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communities that have already allowed limited cultivation and distribution of  medical marijuana by 
caregivers and small dispensaries may balk at authorizing recreational retail stores: “some towns will 
ban retail [because] they don’t want people specifi cally coming into your town to buy drugs. That’s 
how they think about it” (Boyer 2015). This could help drive business to caregivers and existing 
small dispensaries. One small marijuana business owner argues, “in the early days of legalization, 
buying marijuana in Maine will likely mean long drives for many. [. . .] that will likely result in more 
people seeking a medical use card” (Whittle 2019). 
 But the distinctions between the medical and recreational sectors are being whittled away. The 
same month as the  Wellness lawsuit against residency requirements was fi led, the Maine legislature 
imposed new testing requirements on medical marijuana products to make them more consistent 
with the recreational market (Overton 2020a). 8 Expensive testing requirements are likely to force 
small growers and producers out of business, or into investor-controlled economies of scale. 
 Paul McCarrier (Lobbyist, small grower, and cannabis business owner): 
 I think at least 60% of caregivers think that the law that passed is not good. People tell me, 
they’ll say, ‘you ruined my life because now the price is going down and I can’t make it.’ A lot 
of people are going to lose out because what the legislature did; they made it where there’s 
going to be an unlimited amount of cultivation. But we’re selling a unique commodity that 
can’t legally cross state lines. And what you’ll see when you have unlimited licenses and a 
limited market, is a race to the bottom with prices. The farmers lose. And because we don’t 
have access to traditional fi nancing methods [like small business bank loans], if you’re a small 
farmer, you’re at the mercy of capital. That’s why, in our law [the voter-approved initiative], 
we tried to have limited licenses and to ensure that they fi rst went to people who were already 
in the medical marijuana industry. That would have given those farmers leverage in negotia-
tions with capital when it came to interest rates and equity. But now, if you have the capital, 
you can go out and get your own license. Why do you need me? You’ll just go out and get 
the license and say ‘hey Paul, I’ll pay you $10 an hour to be my weed farmer’ as opposed to 
‘hey Paul, I’ll lend you the million dollars you need to successfully develop your company in 
the foreseeable future but I want 50% equity.’ And you could have said, ‘I want 51%; you can 
have 49%, and then I’ll take your million.’ So, you could say we are coming to the end of the 
fi rst Golden Age of cannabis in Maine. I mean, money is going to get involved with this no 
matter what you do. You can’t stop the fl ow of money; it’s like stopping the fl ow of water. It 
will always get where it wants to go. 
 With the coming wave of corporate cannabis, much is riding on the consumer. As Mark Barnett 
of the Maine Craft Cannabis Association observes: “It’s going to be up to Maine consumers to do 
a little education to learn where their marijuana is coming from. Do they want to support the out-
of-state bully that sued the state when it didn’t get what it wanted, or do they want to support small 
Maine businesses” (Overton 2020b). 
 Diane Russell, for her part, is placing her hope on “niche markets”: “You’ll see niche markets in 
both the medical and adult use sides. I think that’s where the caregivers are going to come into play. 
Because there are a lot of folks out there that all they want to do is grow their bud. They are really 
obsessed with growing their bud. It’s a calling. And there will always be people looking for them. 
But the question is, can they compete? That’s the scary thing” (Russell 2015a). 
 Competition from corporate cannabis is an especially unfair match under the current conditions 
of federal prohibition. As McCarrier notes, small growers can’t sell their crop across state lines and 
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cannabis businesses are not eligible for business loans from banks. They also cannot open lines of 
credit and are unable to write-o  business expenses (Fertig 2019). To fi nance a cannabis business 
under these conditions means either taking out a personal loan using a family home as collateral, or, 
for the big players, relying on large private loans from venture capitalists. 
 Already in some states with legalized marijuana, like Oregon, massive overproduction by large 
corporate cultivators has led to a glut of marijuana and a collapse in the price (Associated Press 2018; 
Foden-Vencil 2019; Schaneman 2018). The large cannabis businesses are able to take the losses in the 
interest of market capture while small cannabis farmers, ineligible for crop insurance and bankruptcy 
protection, will lose their farms and homes (Fertig 2019). 
 What to Do—Directions for Future Research 
 More research needs to be done on the e ects of corporate cannabis on small growers, especially in 
rural areas where cannabis cultivation under conditions of prohibition blunted the e ects of dein-
dustrialization by providing an alternative source of income. Alongside a regional class focus, future 
research must also stay focused on questions of race. The War on Drugs has specifi cally targeted 
people of color 9 while the benefi ts of legalization are being unequally distributed by race. It is a 
shocking indictment that, for example, only one percent of legal storefront marijuana businesses in 
the US are currently owned by Black Americans (Chicago-Lewis 2016). 
 The “early adopter” states for marijuana legalization, like Colorado and Washington state, did 
not include provisions to address those inequalities. However, more recent forms of legalization 
legislation in California, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, and Oregon—but notably not (as of 
this writing) Maine—do include specifi c social equity provisions. The most important of these is 
expungement of cannabis convictions. Other provisions have focused on producing more equitable 
distribution of the economic opportunities of cannabis legalization, such as no-interest start-up busi-
ness loans or licensing frameworks that give priority to individuals and communities most heavily 
impacted by the criminalization of cannabis. 
 These social equity provisions are an important focus of future research; knowledge about best 
practices will inform better marijuana legalization legislation going forward. But even well-crafted 
cannabis laws can o er only limited benefi t in repairing the massive harms done by the War on 
Drugs—and the massive diversion of government resources to fi ght it. 
 Since 1971, the War on Drugs has cost US taxpayers an estimated $1 trillion dollars; marijuana 
prohibition, alone, costs $7.7 billion a year (Pearl 2018). In a post-prohibition era, researchers could 
turn their attention to a “peace dividend,” examining how best, and most equitably, to allocate 
resources to repair the widespread damage done in the name of a “drug-free America.” 
 But, despite progress in ending cannabis prohibition, the War on Drugs is far from over. Even 
the war on cannabis has not ended. Marijuana remains illegal in many states as well as under 
federal law; as recently as 2018, about 4 in every 10 drug arrests were for marijuana o enses 
(Gramlich 2020). Even in states that have legalized marijuana, like Maine, implementation often 
seems designed to ensure that some growers and producers will be forced outside the law. It is 
worth emphasizing that this is not what voters intended by legalization. As Mark Barnett of 
the Maine Craft Cannabis Association observes, marijuana legalization as implemented in 2020, 
“leaves Maine voters with almost nothing we voted for in 2016. Mainers did not want corporate 
marijuana, but that is exactly what we’ll be getting now. It’s going to be a race to the bottom” 
(Overton 2020b). 
 If access to legal, a ordable, and accessible weed was the only goal of legalization, marijuana 
will surely have completed its journey from movement to market. “Users” will simply become 
“consumers,” and “growers” and “dealers” will be replaced by large corporate entities like Wellness 
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Connection/Acreage Holdings. Meanwhile, groups that have faced disproportionate risk, and expe-
rienced disproportionate punishment, during the War on Drugs will continue to pay the price. 
 “Tom” (former small grower and formerly incarcerated drug law o ender): 10
 “I’m from Bellfl ower, Maine. Used to be called Bellfl ower Mills; they changed the name after 
there were no more mills. From the age of 10, I saw that the only way you were ever going to 
make something of yourself was if you grew weed. The weed that was grown in my town was 
from necessity. Mainly we didn’t even get to smoke it, the good weed. The good stu  got sent 
away immediately and sold for top dollar. It’s like the town knew that our weed that we grew 
was too good for us to smoke because we needed it fi nancially. Everybody enjoyed that money. 
People would get work done on their cars and the automotive people would be happy. People 
that worked on houses, a guy would have a good grow and fi x his roof. It was a really romantic 
time to be a grower because it was make or break. It was like you can have all those things, like 
I said: fi x your house, buy a truck. Or you could end up in jail. So, I’m kind of on the fence 
about legalization; I hope maybe some folks in my community can make legalization work for 
them. But there’s still no work up there; growing marijuana is like the last thing we are clinging 
to, to be able to maintain our way of life. I worry that some people will think ‘well alright; we 
won. It’s legalized.’ ” 
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 Notes 
 1  For more information about WAMM, see Chapkis and Webb (2008). 
 2  The Corrals were forced to sell their land; this challenged the model under which they were operating. 
Currently WAMM is securing licenses and permits from the City of Santa Cruz and the State of California 
to reopen as a plant therapy center that will include medical marijuana provision. 
 3  As David Boyer noted, under the cultivation cap, less than 150 licenses would be available for small growers, 
which would create intense competition among the more than 3,000 licensed medical marijuana caregivers 
who might want to enter the recreational market (Boyer, 2015). 
 4  The narrow margin was due in part to the fact that areas of the state where cannabis is cultivated (Down 
East, interior, and northern Maine) all voted against legalization. This suggests that small growers remained 
suspicious. The high levels of support for legalization in urban areas, like Portland, helped tip the balance in 
favor of legalization, but only barely (New York Times 2017). 
 5  In the same election, voters had also approved a new state tax of 3% on those earning more than $200,000 
to benefi t education; a ranked choice voting system for state and federal elections; and a raise in the state 
minimum wage. The legislature repealed the new 3% tax and signifi cantly weakened both the ranked choice 
voting law and the minimum wage increase. Legislators then turned their attention to rewriting the mari-
juana legalization law (Mistler 2017). 
 6  In 2019, controlling interest in Wellness Connection was held by one of the world’s largest cannabis corpo-
rations, Acreage Holdings, based in New York. According to their website,  Acreage Holdings is “a leading, 
vertically integrated multi-state operator” controlling 1.2 million square feet of cultivation and manufac-
turing in 20 states. Their board includes John Boehner (R-Ohio), former Canadian Conservative Prime 
Minister Brian Mulroney, and former Massachusetts Republican Governor William Weld.  https://www.
acreageholdings.com/ . 
 7  The revised regulations required that, through 2024, a majority ownership be held by persons who resided 
in the state for at least half of the year and had paid taxes in Maine for the past 4 years. O  cers, directors, 
managers, and general partners in Maine marijuana businesses also were required to be Maine residents. 
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 8  Previously, small caregiver medical marijuana businesses were only required to test their products to support 
advertising claims such as “pesticide-free” or percentage of THC. The new regulations will now require the 
same potency-testing used in the adult-use recreational market. 
 9  As is frequently noted, Blacks and Whites use cannabis and other drugs at similar rates, but Blacks have been 
almost 4 times as likely to be arrested for marijuana o enses (ACLU 2013). See also Duchemin (2017) on 
the disproportionate arrest of People of Color in states after the enactment of some decriminalization. 
 10  Tom’s name and his town have been changed to protect his anonymity (Tom 2015). 
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